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ABSTRACT
We show that adaptive agents on the Internet can learn to exploit bidding agents who use a (limited) number
of xed strategies. These learning agents can be generated by adapting a special kind of nite automata
with evolutionary algorithms (EAs). Our approach is especially powerful if the adaptive agent participates
in frequently occurring micro-transactions, where there is suÆcient opportunity for the agent to learn online
from past negotiations. More in general, results presented in this paper provide a solid basis for the further
development of adaptive agents for Internet applications.
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Note: Work carried out under theme SEN4 \Evolutionary Systems and Applied Algorithmics". An earlier
version of this paper has been presented at the 7
th
International Conference of the Society for Computational
Economics on Computing in Economics and Finance (CEF'2001) (New Haven, CT, USA, June 28-29, 2001). An
abstract of this paper has also been published in the Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation
Conference (GECCO'2001) (San Francisco, CA, USA, July 7-11, 2001, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, p. 1093).
This research has been performed within the framework of the project \Autonomous Systems of Trade Agents
in E-Commerce", which is funded by the Telematics Institute in the Netherlands.
1. Introduction
The rapid growth of a global electronic market place, together with the establishment of standard
negotiation protocols, currently leads to the development of multi-agent architectures in which articial
agents can negotiate on behalf of their users [4, 8]. Most of today's (prototype) systems for automated
negotiations, like Kasbah or Te^te-a-Te^te, use simple and static negotiation rules. We show, however,
that such \xed" bidding agents can be exploited by more sophisticated \adaptive" agents. These
adaptive agents are able to learn strategies which perform (almost) optimally against a variety of
xed opponents. Furthermore, they are able to adapt their strategies online to deal with changing
opponents and open environments.
Our results thus imply that xed bargaining strategies should not be used for bounded environments
(like specic business-to-business markets) with only a limited number of participants and agent types.
Instead, we recommend to design and use adaptive agents. For open environments, like the Internet,
the usage of an (almost) xed strategy oered by some provider is not recommended for the same
reason.
We implement an adaptive agent as a collection of bargaining strategies (represented as nite
automata) which is optimized by an evolutionary algorithm (EA) [11, 2]. EAs transfer the principles
of natural evolution, rst discovered by Darwin, to a computational setting. These algorithms have
been used in the past, with considerable success, to solve diÆcult optimization problems [11, 2]. More
2recently, EAs have also been used as an innovative and powerful way to develop adaptive agents who
are able to operate successfully in multi-agent systems [12, 5, 1, 9, 15, 14, 6].
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An adaptive agent (using an EA) is able to improve its performance by (i) experimenting with
novel strategies (\mutation"), (ii) combining (\crossing-over") previously-used strategies, and (iii)
removing inferior strategies (\selection"). Such an evolutionary approach is especially powerful if the
agent participates in frequently occurring micro-transactions (i.e., transactions with a small value). In
this case, the agent has suÆcient opportunity to experiment with dierent strategies and learn online
from past negotiations.
We focus on so-called multi-issue negotiations in this paper. In multi-issue negotiations not only one
aspect, namely the price of a product, is important, but other aspects are taken into account as well
(for instance the quality of the product, the delivery time, etc.). These multi-issue negotiations give
the two parties the opportunity to reach more satisfactory deals compared to negotiations which only
concern the price of the product. The complexity of multi-issue negotiations increases rapidly, however,
when the number of issues becomes large. This explains the need for powerful search techniques (like
EAs) to generate eective bargaining strategies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The class of bargaining problems that we
consider is briey discussed in Section 2. Section 3 then explains how adaptive agents can be generated
for this class of problems using evolutionary techniques. The bargaining strategies used by the adaptive
agent consist of nite automata. Section 4 discusses the automaton design that we use. In Section 5,
we describe the opponents of the adaptive agent in the computational experiments. These experiments
are presented in Section 6. In this section the adaptive agents compete against dierent opponents in
various (static and dynamic) environments. Section 7 concludes.
2. The multi-issue bargaining problem
We consider the well-known alternating-oers bargaining protocol [13]. When the game starts, one of
the two parties is designated (at random) to make the rst oer. At time t = 0, this player (denoted
as \player 1") makes an oer. The other player (denoted as \player 2") then accepts or rejects the
initial oer. If the initial oer is rejected, player 2 makes a counter oer in the next round (at t = 1).
This alternating process of making proposals then continues until an oer is accepted or until the
bargaining deadline is reached (at t = n). If no agreement has been reached before the deadline (that
is, for t < n) both players receive nothing. We set n equal to 10 in this paper.
Players are allowed to bargain over multiple issues simultaneously (as we mentioned in the Intro-
duction). Formally, a multi-issue oer can be denoted as a vector ~o. The i-th component of this
vector, denoted as o
i
, species the share of issue no. i that the proposing player receives if his oer
is accepted. The index i ranges from 0 to m   1, where m is the total number of issues. We assume
(without loss of generality) that the total bargaining surplus available per issue is equal to unity.
Each player independently evaluates the utility (or \payo") of the received oers. We assume that
the players use an additive utility function. The utility function u(~o) can be written in this case as
u(~o) =
P
m 1
i=0
w
i
o
i
, where ~w is an m-dimensional vector of \weights" for all issues. The weight vector
is normalized (i.e.,
P
m 1
i=0
w
i
= 1).
3. Designing adaptive agents
We implement an adaptive agent as a collection of strategies which is optimized by an evolutionary
algorithm (EA) [11, 2]. EAs transfer the principles of natural evolution, rst discovered by Darwin, to
a computational setting. These algorithms have been used in the past, with considerable success, to
solve diÆcult optimization problems. Examples include problems with huge search spaces, multiple
local optima, discontinuities, and noise [11, 2].
As in natural ecosystems, EAs typically evolve a population of individuals. Here, each individual
is a bargaining strategy of the adaptive agent. These bargaining strategies consist of a special kind
1
An excellent overview of (earlier) research on learning in multi-agent systems is given in [16, Ch. 6].
3of nite automata (see Section 4). Like in nature, the survival of each bargaining strategy depends
on its tness (the \survival of the ttest" concept). We use the mean utility obtained by a strategy
(against the dierent opponents) as its tness measure (see Section 5).
An outline of the EA, which optimizes the strategies of the adaptive agent, is given in (the lower part
of) Fig. 1. A technical description of our EA implementation is given in Appendix 2. The interested
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Figure 1: Iteration loop of the evolutionary algorithm (EA). This algorithm updates the population
of strategies used by the adaptive agent.
reader is referred to this appendix for further details.
The EA starts with a randomly initialized \parental" population of bargaining strategies. The
tness of these strategies is then determined by letting them negotiate with a group of opponents
(see Section 5). The mean utility obtained in these negotiations (averaged over all opponents) is used
as the tness value of the evolutionary strategy. Subsequently, \ospring" strategies are created (see
Fig. 1). The ospring strategies are generated by selecting two strategies in the parental population (at
random, with replacement). Two ospring strategies are then created from the two parents. These
ospring strategies are generated by mutation, which (randomly) changes parts of the strategies,
and recombination, which combines (\crosses-over") the two parental strategies. This process is
repeated until the ospring population is lled. The tness of the new ospring is again determined
by negotiation with the pool of opponents. In the nal stage (see Fig. 1), the ttest strategies from
the parental and ospring populations are selected as the new \parents" for the next iteration. This
nal step completes one iteration (or \generation") of the EA. When this iterative process is repeated
by the adaptive agent, highly-t strategies will evolve in the course of time (see Section 6).
4. Bargaining automata
We represent the agent's bargaining strategies by a special kind of nite automata. Our automaton
design follows, and further extends, previous (theoretical) work by Binmore et al. [3]. Their nite
automata are adaptations of Moore automata [7]. A Moore automaton can be represented by a four-
tuple (S; s
init
; h; f), where S = fs
0
; s
1
; :::; s
q 1
g is a nite set of q states; s
init
2 S is the automaton's
initial state; h(s) : S ! A is an output function, associating an action h(s) from a set of actions A with
every state s 2 S; and f(s; a) is a transition function identifying the state to which the automaton
shifts after receiving action a 2 A as an input in state s 2 S. Note that the set of possible outputs
associated with a state (i.e., the set A) is simply equal to the set of all possible (multi-dimensional)
oers (i.e., [0; 1]
m
). We use automata with 8 states in the computational experiments (i.e., q = 8).
Binmore et al. argue that a player should be able to behave dierently when selected to be the
initial proposer or the initial responder (see [3, pp. 263-264]). We therefore distinguish between an
initial state for the initial proposer, s
init;1
, and an initial state for the initial responder, s
init;2
. This
allows the automata to condition their behavior on their role in the game.
To avoid a continuation of the bargaining process ad innitum, Binmore et al. also assume that
4each automaton contains at least one \acceptance" state. A transition to this state signals that an
oer has been accepted and terminates the game. We use a slightly dierent approach. Instead of
adding an acceptance state, we associate an acceptance threshold value 
acc
with each state. When
an automaton receives an oer ~o from the opponent, it rst makes a transition (as specied by the
transition function f(s; ~o)). The automaton then compares the utility u(~o) of the proposal with the
acceptance threshold value 
acc
which is attached to the state where it has just arrived. If u(~o)  
acc
,
the proposal is accepted, otherwise a counter oer is made. Computational experiments show that
this acceptance model yields superior results compared to a model with acceptance states.
Finally, we specify the transition function f(s; ~o), which species the state to which the automaton
shifts when receiving a proposal ~o in state s. In principle, arbitrarily complex mappings from actions
to states are allowed. It is for instance possible to construct automata with q dierent transitions
per state. Such automata are very complex, however, and are therefore not useful in a computational
setting. We therefore propose a more eÆcient transition model, which requires automata with only
two dierent transitions per state.
We rst associate an (m-dimensional) transition threshold ~
tr
with each state. The proper tran-
sition is then determined by comparing the m components of the opponent's proposal ~o with the
corresponding elements of ~
tr
. In our transition model, only two transitions (denoted as f
0
and f
1
)
are possible per state. Transition f
1
is selected if o
i
 
tr;i
for all i = 0; :::;m 1. Otherwise, transition
f
0
is selected. The transition threshold ~
tr
thus partitions the set A in two disjunct sets, for each of
which a dierent transition can be made.
Figure 2 gives an example of an automaton with two states which is able to negotiate over two
issues. When this automaton is designated to submit the rst oer in the game, the initial state is s
1
o o > o
o o > o
= 0.5 = 0.2
= 0.3 = 0.9 = 0.6
= 0.6 = 0.5 = 0.7
t tacc acc
0 0 0
1 1 1
s0 s1
sinit,1sinit,2
else
always
Figure 2: Example of an automaton with two states which is able to negotiate over two issues.
(because s
init;1
= s
1
). We assume that f
0
= f
1
= s
1
for this state. This implies that the automaton
will remain in state s
1
and repeat the oer (0:6; 0:7)
T
until the utility of the opponent's oer exceeds
(or equals) the acceptance threshold 
acc
= 0:2 (and a deal is made).
When this automaton is the initial responder, it shifts to state s
0
(because s
init;2
= s
0
). We assume
that 
tr;0
= 0:9, 
tr;1
= 0:5, f
0
= s
0
and f
1
= s
1
for this state. The automaton will thus make a
transition from state s
0
to state s
1
if the opponent demands at least 0.9 for issue no. 0 and at least
0.5 for issue no. 1. Otherwise, the automaton remains in state s
0
. After the appropriate transition
has been made, the utility of the opponent's oer is compared with the acceptance threshold which is
associated with the current state. If this threshold is not reached, the opponent's proposal is rejected
and a counter oer is made, etc.
5. A test suite of bargaining strategies
The opponents of the adaptive agent are briey introduced in this section. Appendix 1 contains a
more detailed description of the dierent opponents. We select the opponents from three important
\families" of bargaining tactics: time-dependent, minimal-concession, and behavior-dependent tactics
[9]. Time-dependent strategies do not take the behavior of their opponent into account, but simply
base their move on the passage of time. Minimal-concession strategies typically make small concessions
on (one on more) issues each time they propose an oer. Behavior-dependent strategies base their
move on the behavior of their opponent during the game.
5It is rather straightforward to derive an optimal strategy against an opponent with a known tactic
and preferences. The problem becomes much more complicated, however, when an agent is bargaining
with a variety of dierent opponents without knowing the opponents' tactics or preferences. A strategy
that performs well against one opponent type may in fact lead to very poor results against other
opponents in this case.
The combination of time-dependent, minimal-concession, and behavior-dependent strategies is par-
ticularly challenging in this respect. To reach an agreement against a behavior-dependent opponent,
one needs to concede on one or more issues (otherwise the opponent will not make a concession as
well). Against a time-dependent strategy conceding is an ineÆcient strategy, on the other hand, be-
cause such an opponent will automatically concede the entire bargaining surplus when the deadline is
almost reached. Waiting until the deadline approaches is also a good strategy when playing against
a minimal-concession strategy. A signicant concession should be made just before the deadline,
however, otherwise a deal might not be reached with this kind of opponent.
An eective bargaining agent should thus be able to discriminate between various opponent types
and behave dierently against dierent opponents. This is a challenging task, especially when the
tactics and preferences of the opponents are unknown. We show, however, in the next section that
adaptive agents (based upon evolving nite automata) can meet these requirements.
6. Results
Section 6.1 discusses the performance of adaptive agents in a bounded negotiation environment (like
specic business-to-business markets). In these computational experiments, the pool of opponents is
not changing over time, i.e., the environment is static. We show that adaptive agents can eectively
exploit a set of xed opponents when operating in such an environment.
Section 6.2 extends these results by considering situations where the number of opponents is chang-
ing over time. This models an open and dynamic environment (like the Internet), where new competi-
tors arrive at the marketplace and others leave. We show, in a series of computational experiments,
that adaptive agents are able to adjust their behavior rapidly when new opponents enter the market-
place. The adaptive agents are also able to learn eective negotiation strategies when the group of
opponents is changing very frequently over time.
6.1 Bounded environments
In Section 6.1, we consider the situation where an adaptive agent bargains over two issues with a
limited set of opponents (nine in total, see Appendix 1.1). The issue weights are set equal to w
0
= 0:7
and w
1
= 0:3 for the adaptive agent in this case. For the opponents, w
0
= 0:3 and w
1
= 0:7. This
means that the adaptive agent clearly prefers the rst issue, whereas the opponents prefer the second
issue. Such a bargaining problem is called \integrative" in the sense that both parties can reach a
mutually benecial agreement by conceding on their least important issue.
In Section 6.1, we consider a much more complex bargaining problem involving eight issues and a
large number of opponents (22 in total, see Appendix 1.2). The opponent group contains members
with dierent preferences in this case.
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This increases the diversity in the group of opponents, and,
consequently, the diÆculty of the bargaining problem.
Negotiations over two issues Figure 3 shows the performance of the adaptive agent for a two-issue
bargaining problem. The performance of the agent (shown on the vertical axis) is dened as the mean
tness across the evolving strategies maintained by the agent. The agent starts with a population
of 100 randomly initialized automata (with eight states). Each generation, the agent's population of
strategies is then updated by an EA (as indicated in Fig. 1).
The tness of each evolving strategy is determined in a competition with the set of nine opponents
described in Appendix 1.1. The maximum tness level that can be reached against these opponents
2
The (eight-dimensional) weight vector is set equal to
1
3:9
(0:7; 0:3; 0:5; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 1:0)
T
for the adaptive agent
in these experiments. The issue weights for each of the 22 opponents are drawn from a at distribution in this case.
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Figure 3: Performance of the adaptive agent for a two-issue bargaining problem. Means and standard
deviations are calculated across 25 experiments with dierent random seeds.
(on average against the entire group) is  0:687. This theoretical upper bound is indicated with the
horizontal line in Fig. 3. A strategy can only reach this performance level by executing a best-response
tactic against each opponent.
3
Figure 3 shows that the performance level of the adaptive agent approaches this upper limit in the
long run. We can thus conclude that, after a training period, an adaptive agent can reach a very high
performance level against a variety of opponents. This is a striking result, since the adaptive agent
receives no explicit information about the identity or preferences of the opponents.
Example Figure 4 shows an example of a four-state automaton which is capable of negotiating
about two issues. This automaton has a tness of  0:664. This tness level is only 3% below
the theoretical upper limit, i.e., performance is nearly optimal against all opponents. Performance
improves only slightly if automata with more than four states are considered. The initial state of the
automaton is s
0
when it is designated to be the initial proposer. When the automaton is the initial
responder, its starting state is s
3
.
The various transition thresholds have been tuned by the EA to shift the automaton to the proper
state(s) for each type of opponent. It is instructive to inspect the automaton's state when (or just
before) an agreement is reached.
 Playing against the time-dependent opponents, the automaton is in state s
0
when making a
proposal in the last round of the game. This implies (see Fig. 4) that the automaton claims the
whole surplus just before the deadline. The time-dependent opponents all accept this take-it-
or-leave-it oer and the automaton reaches an optimal deal.
 The automaton reaches an agreement early in the game when playing against the behavior-
dependent opponents. The automaton shifts to state s
3
against these opponents and properly
makes a large concession on its least important issue (issue no. 1). This oer is accepted by the
two behavior-dependent opponents, leading to a mutually benecial outcome for both parties.
3
When the number of issuesm is small, e.g., when m = 2, the optimal strategy against each of the nine opponents can
easily be determined by hand. For large values of m (e.g., for m = 8), nding the optimal strategy against the behavior-
dependent players (see Appendix 1) becomes rather diÆcult by hand, but is still feasible using linear programming
techniques.
7sinit,1
t acc
0
1
= 0.97
o = 1.0
o = 1.0
t acc
0
1
= 0.10
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1
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Figure 4: An automaton (with four states) which is capable of negotiating about two issues.
 Playing against \Minimal" (a slowly conceding strategy, see Appendix 1.1), the automaton is
in state s
2
when the agreement is reached. The automaton concedes partly on issue no. 0 and
fully on issue no. 1 when making a proposal in this state. The partial concession on issue no. 0
is necessary to reach an agreement against the Minimal strategy.
This example shows that very eÆcient bargaining automata, consisting of only a limited number
of states and transitions, can be developed by an adaptive agent. The inspection of the internal
structure of the automaton also provides much insight in what constitutes a successful bargaining
strategy (against a variety of opponents). In particular, dierent internal states are used to reach
(near-optimal) agreements against dierent opponent types.
Negotiations over eight issues A complex bargaining problem, involving eight issues and a large
number of opponents with dierent preferences, is considered in this section. The maximum tness
level that can be reached theoretically against the set of opponents considered here (see Appendix 1.2)
is  0:692. Computational experiments show that the tness of the adaptive agent increases rapidly
from 0:265 0:005 in the rst generation to 0:54 0:02 after 100 generations. The tness of the agent
then increases (more slowly) to 0:590:02 after 500 generations and 0:610:02 after 2000 generations.
4
We can thus conclude that adaptive agents continue to perform well in complex bargaining situations
with a large number of issues and a variety of opponents with dierent preferences.
6.2 Dynamic environments
We now consider more open and dynamic negotiation environments. We rst study a market place
with a increasing number of participants (see Section 6.2). In Section 6.2, we then consider the
situation where some participants temporarily leave the market place, while others return.
4
Means and standard deviations are again measured across 25 experiments with dierent random seeds.
8The computational experiments are performed with similar settings as in Section 6.1. That is,
negotiations involve eight issues and preferences vary across the dierent opponents. The opponents
are again drawn from the extended test suite given in Appendix 1.2.
An increasing number of opponents Figure 5 shows the performance of an adaptive agent when the
number of opponents increases over time. The adaptive agent has a single opponent in the beginning
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Figure 5: Performance of an adaptive agent when the number of opponents increases over time (an
optimal performance of the agent corresponds with the zero-line).
of the experiment. Each 200 generations a new opponent is then added to the group of opponents
of the agent until (after 4200 generations) 22 opponents are present.
5
The opponents thus arrive
one-by-one, with a time interval of 200 generations.
Figure 5 shows the (absolute) dierence between the tness of the adaptive agent
6
and the highest
tness level that can be reached (theoretically) against the current group of opponents. An optimal
performance of the adaptive agent thus corresponds with the zero-line in Fig. 5. Note that the distance
to the optimum sometimes increases signicantly when a new opponent arrives. The adaptive agent
then needs a certain learning period to improve its performance (by developing an eÆcient strategy
against the new opponent). In the long run, when the number of dierent opponents becomes large,
the performance of the adaptive agent remains quite close to optimal.
7
Adaptive agents thus appear
to be capable to adjust and improve their strategies when new opponents arrive on the marketplace.
Changing opponent groups We now consider the performance of the adaptive agent when the com-
position and size of the opponent group uctuates rapidly over time. This situation can occur in
open market places (like the Internet), where the participants may become active at dierent points
in time. Note that the learning problem for the adaptive agent becomes rather diÆcult in this case.
This is due to the fact that the only feedback used by the agent's learning mechanism (the EA) is
the performance (tness) of each strategy against the current group of opponents. The information
available for the agent's EA thus becomes \noisy" when the group of opponents changes randomly
over time. As a result, the diÆculty of the learning problem increases signicantly.
5
The opponents are selected at random (without replacement) from the pool of 22 opponents described in Ap-
pendix 1.2.
6
Recall that the tness of the adaptive agent is dened as the mean tness across the evolving strategies maintained
by the agent.
7
We veried in additional experiments that these positive results are not due to stochastic factors (we varied the
random seeds and the order of appearance of the opponents in these alternative runs).
9Figure 6 shows, however, that the adaptive agent continues to operate successfully in dynamic envi-
ronments. We consider two (extreme) cases in Fig. 6. In the rst (static) case, the group of opponents
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Figure 6: Performance of the adaptive agent when operating in a dynamic environment. The size and
composition of the opponent group changes from generation to generation in this case. We show the
performance of the adaptive agent when competing against the complete set of (22) opponents. For
comparison, we also show the agent's performance in a static environment (the agent is matched with
the complete set of opponents in each generation in this case).
does not change over time (this is the same setup as in Section 6.1). In the second (dynamic) case, the
size and composition of the opponent group is changing randomly from generation to generation.
8
The
agent thus only encounters a subset of all possible opponent types in most generations (on average,
the agent is only matched with the full set of opponents once per 22 generations).
Figure 6 shows, however, that the agent's performance against the full set of opponents increases
steadily over time in the dynamic environment. So, even though the feedback received by the agent is
incomplete and noisy for most generations, high performance levels are reached in the long run. This
implies that the application of adaptive agents is not limited to bounded negotiation environments:
such agents also appear to be capable of negotiating eectively with changing groups of opponents in
open environments.
7. Conclusions
The rapid growth of the Internet currently leads to the development of multi-agent architectures in
which articial agents can negotiate on behalf of their users. Most of today's (prototype) systems
for automated negotiations, like Kasbah or Te^te-a-Te^te, use simple and static negotiation rules. We
show, however, that such \xed" bidding agents can be exploited by more sophisticated \adaptive"
agents. These adaptive agents are able to learn strategies which perform (almost) optimally against
a variety of xed opponents. Furthermore, they are able to adapt their strategies online to deal with
changing opponents and open environments.
We implement an adaptive agent as a collection of bargaining strategies (represented as nite
automata) which is optimized by an evolutionary algorithm (EA). This evolutionary approach has
been advocated recently as an innovative and powerful way to develop exible agents for automated
negotiations. An adaptive agent (using an EA) is able to improve its performance by (i) experimenting
8
The size of the opponent group uctuates randomly between 1 and 22 in this case. The opponents are again
selected at random (without replacement) from the pool of 22 opponents described in Appendix 1.2. All 22 opponents
are selected in the rst and last generation.
10
with novel strategies (\mutation"), (ii) combining (\crossing-over") previously-used strategies, and
(iii) removing inferior strategies (\selection"). Such an evolutionary approach is especially powerful
if the agent participates in frequently occurring micro-transactions (i.e., transactions with a small
value). In this case, the agent has suÆcient opportunity to experiment with dierent strategies and
learn online from past negotiations.
More in general, research presented in this paper establishes a solid foundation for further research
on the application of adaptive agents to Internet trading.
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1. Description of the opponents
In Appendix 1.1, we introduce a test suite of nine opponents (Linear, Conceder, Boulware, LastMinute,
Minimal, Careful, HardHead, Tit-fot-tat, and Tit-for-tat*). The composition of an extended test suite
(with 22 opponents) is given in Appendix 1.2. The design of most opponents is closely related to the
bargaining tactics described in [9]. All opponents use the same criterion to determine whether an oer
of the opponent is acceptable. This is the case if the utility of the received oer is greater than that
of the counter oer the player would propose at this point. Otherwise, a counter oer is submitted.
1.1 Basic test suite
Time-dependent strategies These strategies do not take the behavior of their opponent into account,
but simply base their move on the passage of time. For each issue no. i these strategies demand the
same fraction o
i
= 1  (t=t
max
)
1

, where t = 0; :::; t
max
is the round number, t
max
is the last round of
the game, and the parameter  2 R
+
can be varied to obtain a range of dierent polynomial functions.
When  is small, the strategy concedes slowly initially, but relatively fast as the deadline approaches
(the opposite holds for large values of ). For the strategy \Linear"  = 1, for \Conceder"  = 2,
for \Boulware"  = 0:5, and for \LastMinute"  # 0. (LastMinute concedes the entire surplus to the
opponent when t = t
max
.)
Minimal-concession strategies These strategies typically make small concessions on (one on more)
issues each time they propose an oer. In the experiments, these strategies start by demanding o
i
= 1.
Each next demand is then reduced with a small amount  ( = 0:05, unless stated otherwise). Note
that these strategies do not explicity take the nite deadline of the game into account. Since we set
t
max
= 9 in the computer experiments, a concession of at most 5 = 0:25 can be made for each issue
(when t = 9).
A typical example of this tactic is the \Minimal" strategy, who concedes simultaneously on all
issues. The strategy \Careful" is very similar, but diers in one respect: Careful starts to concede on
its least important issue rst. Only when a full concession is made on this issue, concessions will be
made on the second least important issue, etc. The \HardHead" strategy always demands the whole
surplus for each issue.
Behavior-dependent strategies This is another important class of bargaining strategies. These tactics
base their move on the behavior of their opponent during the game. The \Tit-for-tat" strategy exactly
mimics the opponent's behavior. When the opponent makes a concession Æo
i
 o
i
(t   2)   o
i
(t   1)
on issue no. i, Tit-for-tat concedes exactly the same amount on the same issue in round t.
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If the
9
Tit-for-tat's oer ~o is restricted to the set [0; 1]
m
. Imitating the opponent's behavior can lead to counter oers (by
Tit-for-tat) which are located outside this set. To avoid this, each oer o
i
(for issue no. i) which exceeds the [0; 1]
interval is reset to zero (if the oer would become negative) or unity (if the oer would become larger than this value).
The remaining discrepancy is stored by Tit-for-Tat. In the next round, the concession of the opponent on issue no. i is
then discounted with this amount.
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duration of the negotiation does not permit this tactic to be applied (i.e., before the opponent has
made two oers), Tit-for-tat employs a Minimal tactic.
Tit-for-tat is not an eÆcient strategy under all circumstances. For instance, in an integrative
bargaining situation both parties need to concede on dierent issues to arrive at outcomes that are
mutually benecial. We therefore include a variant of Tit-for-tat (denoted as \Tit-for-tat*"). This
strategy does not concede (in general) on the same issue as the opponent (as Tit-for-tat does) ifm > 1.
In case m = 2, Tit-for-tat* rst determines the concessions Æo
0
and Æo
1
of his opponent and then
concedes the same amount on the opposite issues (i.e., Æo
0
on issue no. 1 and Æo
1
on issue no. 0). In
case m = 8, Tit-for-tat* concedes on the most important issue if the opponent also concedes on his
most important issue. A concession of the opponent on his second most important issue then leads to
a concession on the second most important issue by Tit-for-tat*, etc., in order of importance of the
respective issues.
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1.2 Extended test suite
This test suite includes the nine strategies from Appendix 1.1. We also add seven new time-dependent
strategies. These strategies are generated by varying the -parameter which determines their bid
function. This parameter is set equal to 0.25, 0.75, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2.5, and 3 for the new opponents.
We also add six new minimal-concession strategies. Three of them execute the \Careful" strategy,
but with a concession step  equal to 0.025, 0.1, and 0.2. Three \Minimal" strategies, with similar
values for , are added to the opponent pool as well. This yields a total of 22 opponents.
2. Description of the evolutionary algorithm
An evolutionary algorithm (EA) is used to evolve the bargaining strategies of the adaptive agents.
This appendix contains a detailed description of our EA implementation. The main components of
the EA are visible in Figure 1: the EA starts with an initial population of strategies, generates new
\ospring" strategies by mutation and recombination, and selects the best strategies for the next
iteration ("generation"). The EA then repeats this iterative process to generate highly-t strategies
in the course of time.
In the remainder of this appendix we rst describe the genetic representation of the bargaining
strategies. We then discuss the main components of the EA.
Strategy encoding A bargaining strategy of the adaptive agent, which consists of a nite automaton
(see Section 4), is represented as an ordered sequence of genes in our evolutionary model.
11
All genes
together constitute the chromosome. The typical structure of such a chromosome is shown in Fig. 7.
Figure 7a shows the global structure of a chromosome which encodes a nite automaton with q internal
states. States are indexed by the numbers 0; :::; q   1. From left to right, the chromosome consists
of several packets of genes containing (i) a pointer to the initial state for the initial proposer and
responder (s
init;1
and s
init;2
) and (ii) the description of all internal states s
0
; :::; s
q 1
.
The structure of a single state is shown in detail in Fig. 7b. One state contains the consecutive
description of the acceptance threshold 
acc
, the (m-dimensional) oer ~o, the components of the
transition threshold ~
tr
, and the components of the transition function
~
f (being f
0
and f
1
).
The chromosomes are represented by binary-coded strings (see Fig. 7c). We represent each value
on the chromosome (e.g., for an oer, threshold, etc.) with a sequence of 5 bits. The interval between
two successive values is thus equal to 1/31 (because all oers and thresholds are restricted to the unit
interval). Since we use automata with 8 states, the pointers to states are encoded with 3 bits. The
chromosomes in the initial population consist of randomly initialized bitstrings.
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We thus assume that Tit-for-tat* knows the ranking of the opponent's weights (for the dierent issues). The
adaptive agent receives no information about the opponents' preferences in the computational experiments.
11
Our approach is inspired by Miller's work [10] on the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Miller encoded the game-playing
automata as binary strings and adapted them using an EA.
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Structure of an automaton (with states):
s s state s state s ... state s state s
o … o … f f
q
(a)
(b)
(c) 010011100101100101101011001110011011000100...
init,1 init,2 0 1 q-2 q-1
acc 0 m-1 tr,0 tr,m -1 0 1t t t
Figure 7: Genetic representation of an automaton with q states. (a) The global structure of the
chromosome. The initial states for the initial proposer and responder (s
init;1
and s
init;2
) refer to
one of the q machine states s
0
  s
q 1
. (b) Structure of a single internal state. (c) Example of a
binary-coded automaton.
Mutation and recombination Binary-coded individuals are typically mutated with a small probabil-
ity in EAs. We set this probability equal to 0.01 (per bit). In addition, two-point crossover (with a
crossover probability of 0.6) is used. We follow the common practice to use a Gray-code interpreta-
tion of the bitstring segments. Additional experiments show that our settings for the mutation and
crossover probabilities are chosen properly.
Selection Selection is performed by ranking all  parents and their  ospring, and transferring the
 top-performing strategies to the next generation. We set  =  = 100. This selection scheme is
formally denoted as (+ ) selection [2]. We also investigated the performance of various alternative
selection methods (e.g., tness proportional and tournament selection). Results obtained with (+)
selection are superior, however, to results obtained with these alternative selection schemes.
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